Marquette Elder's Advisor
Volume 14
Issue 2 Spring

Article 4

Health Care Decision Making in the Veterans
Health Administration: The Legal Significance for
Informed Consent and Advance Directives
Liliana Kalogjera Barry

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/elders
Part of the Elder Law Commons, and the Health Law Commons
Recommended Citation
14 MARQ. ELDER’S ADVISOR 269 (2013)

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Marquette Elder's Advisor by an authorized administrator of Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact
megan.obrien@marquette.edu.

33718-mqe_14-2 Sheet No. 67 Side A

07/02/2013 13:56:24

PUBLISHED.BARRY.MACROS (DO NOT DELETE)

6/17/2013 1:02 PM

HEALTH CARE DECISION MAKING IN THE
VETERANS HEALTH ADMINISTRATION: THE
LEGAL SIGNIFICANCE FOR INFORMED CONSENT
AND ADVANCE DIRECTIVES
Liliana Kalogjera Barry*
I. INTRODUCTION
Voluminous literature exists in both the medical and legal
communities on health care decision making, whether it be in
regard to advance directives or end of life decisions.1 There is
also a growing body of research and commentary assessing
various facets of health care decision making in the Veterans
Health Administration (VHA) of the United States Department
of Veterans Affairs (VA).2 There is, however, a relative dearth of
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1. See, e.g., examples cited herein, including Thaddeus Mason Pope, The
Maladaptation of Miranda to Advance Directives: A Critique of the Implementation of the
Patient Self-Determination Act, 9 HEALTH MATRIX 139, 156 (1999) (discussing
existence of over a hundred publications pertaining to the Patient SelfDetermination Act).
2. See, e.g., Kenneth A. Berkowitz, End-Of-Life Decisionmaking in the Veterans
Health Administration, 9 HEC FORUM 169 (1997); Ruth-Ann Phelps, VHA PolicyRelated Clinical Ethical Issues, 9 HEC FORUM 159 (1997); and Ladislav Volicer et al.,
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literature, particularly legal literature, examining the legal
significance of the fact that a patient makes health care decisions
within the VA as opposed to alternative care settings that are
subject to state law, e.g., private health care facilities. This article
provides a background of the VA, an overview of relevant law
pertaining to health care decision making, and a discussion of
significant ways that health care decision making may differ
between VA and non-VA facilities, focusing on Wisconsin law as
an example.3
II. BACKGROUND ON THE VHA
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Advance Care Planning by Proxy for Residents of Long-Term Care Facilities Who Lack
Decision-Making Capacity, 50 J. AM. GERIATRICS SOC’Y 761 (2002).
3. For purposes of this article, “non-VHA facilities” refers to non-VHA
facilities outside of the federal government (e.g., excluding U.S. Department of
Defense facilities).
4. 38 U.S.C. § 301(a) (2012).
5. About VA, U.S. DEP’T VETERANS AFF., http://www.va.gov/landing
2_about.htm (last updated Feb. 17, 2012).
6. 38 U.S.C. § 301(b) (2012).
7. History – VA History, U.S. DEP’T VETERANS AFF., http://www.va.gov/
about_va/vahistory.asp (last updated Apr. 5, 2012).
8. The Executive Branch, THE WHITE HOUSE, http://www.whitehouse.gov/ourgovernment/executive-branch (last visited Oct. 29, 2012).
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The U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs is a federal executive
department4 tasked with the mission described by Abraham
Lincoln “[t]o care for him who shall have borne the battle, and
for his widow, and his orphan.”5 Stated statutorily, the VA’s
purpose is “to administer the laws providing benefits and other
services to veterans and the dependents and the beneficiaries of
Although Congress formally established the
veterans.”6
Veterans Administration in 1930, its roots date back to a 1636
Pilgrim law that provided for colony support of disabled
soldiers.7 The VA “became a cabinet-level department in 1989”
and provides a variety of benefits, including “pension,
education, disability compensation, home loans, life insurance,
vocational rehabilitation, survivor support, medical care, and
burial benefits.”8 The VA touches many Americans because of
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its size; “About a quarter of the nation’s population —
approximately 70 million people — are potentially eligible for
V.A. benefits and services because they are veterans, family
members, or survivors of veterans.”9 In addition to other offices
and agencies, the VA consists of three administrations: the
National Cemetery Administration, the Veterans Benefits
Administration, and the Veterans Health Administration.10
VHA, which serves over 8.3 million veterans annually, is
the nation’s largest integrated health care system, consisting of
152 medical centers, approximately 1,400 community-based
outpatient clinics, community living centers, Vet Centers, and
Domiciliaries.11 VHA employs more than 53,000 health care
providers,12 who provide care across the fifty states and in
American Samoa, Guam, Puerto Rico, the Philippines, and the
Virgin Islands.13
III. OVERVIEW OF LAW PERTAINING TO HEALTH CARE DECISION
MAKING

A. AUTONOMY AND INFORMED CONSENT
The concept of autonomy is the focal point for law and
ethics pertaining to health care decision making.14 Autonomy
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9. Id.
10. 38 U.S.C. § 301(c) (2012).
11. About VHA, U.S. DEP’T VETERANS AFF., http://www.va.gov/health/
aboutVHA.asp (last updated Oct. 5, 2011).
12. Id.
13. Browse Veterans Health Administration Facilities by State, U.S. DEP’T
VETERANS AFF., http://www2.va.gov/directory/guide/Allstate_flsh.asp?dnum=1
(last updated July 23, 2010).
14. See Jaime Staples King & Benjamin W. Moulton, Rethinking Informed
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A basic primer on autonomy and informed consent, advance
directives and the Patient Self Determination Act, and mental
health advance directives helps provide the context for this
article’s discussion of differences between VA and non-VA
facilities.
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Consent: The Case for Shared Medical Decision-Making, 32 AM. J.L. & MED. 429, 434–35
(2006).
15. TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & LEROY WALTERS, CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN
BIOETHICS 22 (6th ed. 2003).
16. Carol J. Wessels, Treated with Respect: Enforcing Patient Autonomy by
Defending Advance Directives, 6 MARQ. ELDER’S ADVISOR 217, 219–20 (2005).
17. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
18. Cruzan v. Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 269 (1990) (citing Union
Pacific R. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891)).
19. Schloendorff v. Soc’y of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914).
20. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 270.
21. Id. at 269.
22. Id. at 262 (holding that, while an incompetent individual may refuse
treatment, the state may require clear and convincing evidence of the incompetent’s
wishes for such refusal).
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means “personal self-governance” in the moral philosophy
context and represents “freedom from external constraint and
the presence of critical mental capacities such as understanding,
intending, and voluntary decision-making capacity.”15
Autonomy has legal roots in the United States Constitution.
These roots include both the federally recognized right of
privacy grounded in the Constitution and the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,16 which prohibits a state
from depriving “any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law.”17
The Supreme Court articulated an individual’s right “to the
possession and control of his own person, free from all restraint
or interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable
authority of law” over a century ago.18 In the health care arena,
this right dictates that “[e]very human being of adult years and
sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his
own body . . . ,”19 which includes the right to refuse medical
treatment.20 The right to refuse treatment stems from the
common law doctrine that touching another without consent or
justification constitutes battery.21 This right to make one’s own
treatment decisions does not end when an individual becomes
incapacitated.22
The doctrine of informed consent is an extension of the right
to refuse unwanted treatment that is both established in
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common law23 and codified in state statutes and/or
regulations.24 It has evolved from a relatively simple batterybased doctrine (i.e., one focused on unwanted touching) to a
more nuanced, negligence-based doctrine (i.e., one focused on
the affirmative obligations of a health care provider).25 Under
the doctrine of informed consent, a health care provider has the
duty to obtain a patient’s informed, voluntary consent for
treatment, absent an applicable exception. Courts are split on
the standard for informed consent, with about half of all states
imposing a physician-based standard (i.e., requiring disclosure
based on the perspective of what a “reasonably prudent
practitioner” would discuss with a patient),26 and the other half
imposing a “reasonable patient” standard (i.e., requiring
disclosure based on the perspective of what a reasonable patient
would want to know from a provider).27 Wisconsin, which
imposes a reasonable patient standard, is one example of a state
that, in addition to common law requirements,28 has imposed
statutory informed consent requirements to require a treating
physician to “inform the patient about the availability of all
alternate, viable medical modes of treatment and about the
benefits and risks of these treatments.”29
B. ADVANCE DIRECTIVES AND THE PSDA
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23. See, e.g., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 780 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
24. See, e.g., WIS. STAT. § 448.30 (2012).
25. BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW 347 (4th ed. 2001).
26. King & Moulton, supra note 14, at 430.
27. Id.
28. Trogun v. Fruchtman, 207 N.W.2d 297, 315 (Wis. 1973).
29. WIS. STAT. § 448.30 (2012).
30. Holly Fernandez Lynch et al., Compliance with Advance Directives: Wrongful
Living and Tort Law Incentives, 29 J. LEGAL MED. 133, 134 (2008).
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Advance directives are legal tools for extending patient
autonomy in the event of decisional incapacity, 30 i.e., in the
event the patient lacks decision making capacity. Through an
advance directive, an individual expresses his/her preferences
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31. Wessels, supra note 16, at 218.
32. Werner Gruber, Life and Death on Your Terms: The Advance Directives
Dilemma and What Should be Done in the Wake of the Schiavo Case, 15 ELDER L. J. 503,
504–05 (2007).
33. Id. at 505.
34. Pope, supra note 1, at 152.
35. BERNARD LO, RESOLVING ETHICAL DILEMMAS 90 (4th ed. 2009).
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Pope, supra note 1, at 147.
39. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, 104 Stat.
1388 (1990) (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C., including 42 U.S.C. § 1395cc
(1990)).
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regarding health care, and the advance directive is used to guide
treatment decisions when the individual is unable to make or
express such decisions.31 Advance directives include the living
will and the durable power of attorney for health care. A living
will or other “instruction directive” is “an advance directive in
which a person establishes a list of guidelines for his or her
future care, but does not appoint someone to carry out those
instructions.”32 Examples of such guidelines include expressions
of the individual’s preferences with regard to tube-feeding and
mechanical ventilation. A durable power of attorney or “proxy
directive” “is an advance directive in which . . . a person is
appointed to carry out the desired instructions or make
decisions regarding the health care of the person executing the
document.”33 The person named as proxy under a health care
power of attorney is also known as a “surrogate decisionmaker,”34 “health care proxy or agent.”35 The agent has the duty
to make decisions “consistent with the patient’s previously
expressed choices or best interests.”36
Today all states have laws in place that recognize some
form of advance directive.37 However, that was not always the
case. States began legal recognition of advance directives
toward the end of the 1970s, but use of advance directives was
relatively rare for their first decade of availability.38
The Patient Self-Determination Act39 (PSDA) represented
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Congress’s attempt to increase the use of advance directives.40
The PSDA imposes various obligations pertaining to advance
directives on health care entities that receive Medicare or
Medicaid funds,41 and VA policy states that it “provides the
model and context for VA policy on advance care planning.”42
These requirements include maintenance of written policies and
procedures regarding adult individuals receiving treatment
from the entity as follows:
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40. Maria J. Silveira et al., Advance Directives and Outcomes of Surrogate Decision
Making Before Death, 362 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1211, 1212 (Apr. 2010).
41. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, 104 Stat.
1388 (1990) (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C., including 42 U.S.C. § 1395cc
(1990)).
42. Advance Care Planning and Management of Advance Directives, VHA
HANDBOOK 1004.02 (Dep’t Veterans Aff., Washington, D.C.), July 2, 2009, at 1
[hereinafter VHA HANDBOOK 1004.02].
43. 42 U.S.C. § 1395cc(f) (2012).
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(A) to provide written information to each such
individual concerning –
(i) an individual’s rights under State law (whether
statutory or as recognized by the courts of the State) to
make decisions concerning such medical care,
including the right to accept or refuse medical or
surgical treatment and the right to formulate advance
directives . . . and
(ii) the written policies of the provider or
organization respecting the implementation of such
rights;
(B) to document in a prominent part of the individual’s
current medical record whether or not the individual
has executed an advance directive;
(C) not to condition the provision of care or otherwise
discriminate against an individual based on whether or
not the individual has executed an advance directive;
(D) to ensure compliance with requirements of State
law (whether statutory or as recognized by the courts
of the State) respecting advance directives at facilities of
the provider or organization; and
(E) to provide (individually or with others) for
education for staff and the community on issues
concerning advance directives.43
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44. Id.
45. Robert S. Olick, Defining Features of Advance Directives in Law and Clinical
Practice, 141 CHEST 232, 233 (2012).
46. Charles P. Sabatino, National Advance Directives: One Attempt to Scale the
Barriers, 1 NAELA J. 131, 132 (2005).
47. Id.
48. OFF. DISABILITY, AGING & LONG-TERM CARE POL’Y, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH &
HUMAN SERV., ADVANCE DIRECTIVES AND ADVANCE CARE PLANNING: A REPORT TO
CONGRESS 13 (2008).
49. LO, supra note 35, at 91.
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The PSDA defines “advance directive” as “a written
instruction, such as a living will or durable power of attorney for
health care, recognized under State law (whether statutory or as
recognized by the courts of the State) and relating to the
provision of such care when the individual is incapacitated.”44
Although the PSDA does not create substantive rights with
regard to advance directives, it sets forth procedures that
“bolster” relevant state laws.45
In addition to the PSDA, the Uniform Health-Care
Decisions Act of 1993 represents an attempt to promote advance
directives through the law.46 However, only seven states have
incorporated this model into law, and they have done so with
added restrictions (e.g., witness requirements).47
Despite attempts to increase the creation and use of advance
directives, weaknesses or limitations of advance directives
remain. Overall completion rates remain low, in the range of 18
to 36 percent for adults.48 In addition, there are practical
problems inherent in the creation of advance directives, and
these problems can affect the overall quality of the resulting
document. For example, due to the information asymmetry
between health care providers and patients, patients may have
erroneous understandings of the nature of various lifesustaining treatments, which could adversely affect their ability
to express their preferences with regard to such treatments.49
Once an advance directive exists, legal barriers may impede the
implementation of an advance directive (e.g., state laws
restricting a health care agent’s ability to act according to the
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principal’s wishes), such as some of the examples discussed
There also may be uncertainty associated with
herein.50
interpreting vague language, as in the case of the patient who
requests no “heroic” or “extraordinary” treatment.51 In addition,
the disappointing fact remains that even when a patient has an
advance directive, the patient often receives care inconsistent
with his/her expressed preferences.52
C. MENTAL HEALTH ADVANCE DIRECTIVES
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50. Wessels, supra note 16, at 225.
51. LO, supra note 35, at 91.
52. Lynch, supra note 30, at 137.
53. NAT’L ETHICS COMM. VETERANS HEALTH ADMIN., ADVANCE DIRECTIVES
FOR MENTAL HEALTH: AN ETHICAL ANALYSIS OF STATE LAWS AND IMPLICATIONS
FOR VHA POLICY 3 (2008).
54. VHA HANDBOOK 1004.02, supra note 42, at 3.
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Mental health or psychiatric advance directives (MHADs)
represent a subset of advance directives geared specifically
toward mental health or psychiatric care. Whereas advance
directives originally focused on end-of-life treatment decisions,
MHADs serve “as a mechanism for enabling patients with
severe mental illness to retain control over their psychiatric
treatment in the event of a mental health crisis.”53 Examples of
mental health treatment preferences include preferences with
regard to medications, inpatient mental health treatment, and
electroconvulsive therapy.54 Like other advance directives,
MHADs may be in the form of a living will (i.e., to state
particular treatment preferences), or in the form of a durable
power of attorney for health care (i.e., to designate a proxy
decision maker). MHADs may represent a section of a general
advance directive for health care or a unique document
specifically designated for mental health treatment preferences.
MHADs may also take the form of a “Ulysses directive,” which
allows individuals “prospectively to bind themselves to
treatment and override, in advance, their refusals during acute
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55. Breanne M. Sheetz, The Choice to Limit Choice: Using Psychiatric Advance
Directives to Manage the Effects of Mental Illness and Support Self-Responsibility, 40 U.
MICH. J.L. REFORM 401, 403 (2007).
56. Roberto Cuca, Ulysses in Minnesota: First Steps Toward a Self-Binding
Psychiatric Advance Directive Statute, 78 Cornell L. Rev. 1152, 1153 (1993).
57. Eric B. Elbogen et al., Effectively Implementing Psychiatric Advance Directives
to Promote Self-Determination of Treatment Among People with Mental Illness, 13
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 273, 275 (2007).
58. Id. at 274; Sheetz, supra note 55, at 404.
59. NAT’L ETHICS COMM. VETERANS HEALTH ADMIN., supra note 53, at 3.
60. Elbogen, supra note 57, at 282.
61. Id. at 275.
62. Sheetz, supra note 55, at 408 (citing statutes from Alaska, Arizona, District
of Columbia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine,
Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, New Jersey, New Mexico, North
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episodes of their illnesses.”55 In theory, a properly executed
Ulysses directive or “contract” would represent the patient’s
informed consent for treatment that the patient may not revoke
during a later period of incompetency.56
Proponents of MHADs highlight their advantages. In
general, MHADs promote patient autonomy by providing
individuals with a vehicle to control and take responsibility for
their treatment.57 MHADs may yield clinical benefits to patients
such as the following: facilitating a patient’s timely access to
treatment that works for him/her;58 “enhanc[ing] relationships
between patients and mental health professionals and
increas[ing] patients’ adherence to therapy, . . . decreas[ing] the
need for involuntary treatment, and reduc[ing] hospitalization
rates for psychiatric patients.”59 Empirical data suggests that
MHADs also serve an important communicative function by
serving as a record of “medically relevant information that
would assist doctors” during an individual’s acute crisis, such as
“medical conditions (e.g., diabetes) that could be masked by
overt mental health symptoms (e.g., depression).”60
However, like all advance directives, mental health advance
directives also have potential weaknesses. These include patient
comprehension of applicable laws, the ability to predict one’s
feelings about future scenarios, and lack of access to MHADs.61
As of 2006, 27 states have legalized MHADs in some form.62
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Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas,
Utah, Washington, and Wyoming).
63. NAT’L ETHICS COMM. VETERANS HEALTH ADMIN., supra note 53, at 3 (citing
North Dakota and Wisconsin).
64. Id. at 3–4.
65. Id. at 4.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 5.
68. Id. at 6.
69. See id. at 7.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 8.
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Of the remaining states, some have acted in the other direction,
i.e., to “specifically limit the degree to which advance directives
can be used to make decisions about mental health care.”63
A February 2008 Report by the National Ethics Committee
of VHA highlights some of the significant features of state law
treatment of MHADs.64 First, some states require automatic
expiration of MHADs, a requirement not seen for other advance
directives, which typically expire upon revocation or upon a
patient’s instructions.65 An individual wishing to maintain a
MHAD in one of these states would have to complete another
MHAD each time after passage of the defined time period.66
Second, to reduce possible coercion, many states restrict who
may serve as a witness to MHADs, excluding individuals such
as family members and treating providers.67 Third, some state
laws set forth “override provisions” that “give clinicians greater
leeway not to follow a MHAD than they do with a general
advance directive.”68 For example, some states permit a
provider not to follow a patient’s MHAD based on inpatient
commitment, emergency, or if a provider determines a treatment
is “essential.”69 Fourth, a couple of states require a positive
capacity assessment by a mental health provider as a
prerequisite for executing a MHAD, a requirement that no states
impose for execution of other advance directives.70 Fifth, some
states permit activation of a MHAD while a patient still has the
capacity to make decisions.71 Finally, some states permit
revocation of a MHAD after the patient has lost decision-making
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capacity, which is also true in many states for other advance
directives.72
Since some states have rejected their use and others have
not addressed their legality, MHADs appear to be more
controversial and relatively new legal tools, whose impact is still
evolving.
IV. HEALTH CARE DECISION MAKING WITHIN THE VA
A. APPLICABLE LAW
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72. Id. at 9.
73. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. See also Ridgway v. Ridgway, 454 U.S. 46, 54–60
(1981); Johnson v. Maryland, 254 U.S. 51, 57 (1920); Ohio v. Thomas, 173 U.S. 276,
283 (1899).
74. 38 U.S.C. § 303 (2012).
75. 38 U.S.C. § 7301(b) (2012).
76. 38 C.F.R. § 17.32 (2012).
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Based on authority rooted in the Supremacy Clause of the
United States Constitution, the VA, a federal agency, is subject to
federal law.73 The Secretary of the VA, a presidential appointee,
has broad authority and “is responsible for the proper execution
and administration of all laws administered by the Department
and for the control, direction, and management of the
Department.”74 Within the VA, the “primary function” of the
VHA is “to provide a complete medical and hospital service for
the medical care and treatment of veterans” as set forth by
statute and pursuant regulations.75
Pursuant to this authority, the VA has its own specific
regulations and policies that pertain to health care decision
making. For purposes of this article, the central regulations are
at 38 C.F.R. Section 17.32, which sets forth the VA’s general
requirements for informed consent and advanced care
planning.76 The VHA’s National Center for Ethics in Health
Care has primary responsibility for “the development and
interpretation of VHA national policies on ethics in health care,”
including “policies on informed consent for treatments and
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procedures, ethical aspects of end-of-life care, advance care
planning, state-authorized portable orders, disclosure of adverse
events to patients, and financial relationships between VHA
health care providers and industry.”77 National policies that
pertain to this article include VHA Handbooks on Informed
Consent for Clinical Treatments and Procedures78 and Advance
Care Planning and Management of Advance Directives.79 Local
policies reiterate the national policies and often provide more
specific guidance on implementation, sometimes incorporating
relevant state law provisions. In addition, ethics consultation is
available at both the local and national levels to provide
guidance in situations involving VA requirements for informed
consent and advance directives. Moreover, the VA’s Office of
General Counsel (including its local Offices of Regional Counsel)
provides legal services to the VA, including advice on legal
issues pertaining to health care decision making.80
B. INFORMED CONSENT
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77. Nat’l Ctr. for Ethics in Health Care, VHA DIRECTIVE 1004 (Dep’t Veterans
Aff., Washington, D.C.), July 29, 2008, at 2.
78. Informed Consent for Clinical Treatments & Procs., VHA DIRECTIVE 1004.01
(Dep’t Veterans Aff., Washington, D.C.), Aug. 14, 2008 [hereinafter VHA
HANDBOOK 1004.01].
79. VHA HANDBOOK 1004.02, supra note 42, at T-1.
80. Id. at 7, 14.
81. 38 U.S.C. § 7331 (2012).

33718-mqe_14-2 Sheet No. 73 Side A

As discussed above, the legal doctrine of informed consent
provides the foundation for one’s individual right to make
health care decisions. The general mandate for VA regulations,
under the applicable federal statute, is “to ensure that all
medical and prosthetic research carried out and, to the
maximum extent practicable, all patient care furnished under
this title shall be carried out only with the full and informed
consent of the patient or subject or, in appropriate cases, a
The VA regulation governing
representative thereof.”81
informed consent and advance care planning provides the
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definitions, policy, general requirements for informed consent
and advance care planning, requirements for documentation of
informed consent, requirements for surrogate consent, and
requirements for special consent situations.82 The national
policies, VHA Handbooks 1004.01 and 1004.02, Informed
Consent for Clinical Treatment and Procedures and Advance
Care Planning and Advance Directives, respectively, mirror and
specify the requirements set forth in 38 CFR Section 17.32.83
1. INFORMED CONSENT REQUIREMENTS IN THE VA
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82. 38 C.F.R. § 17.32 (2012).
83. NAT’L ETHICS COMM. VETERANS HEALTH ADMIN., supra note 53, at 2; VHA
HANDBOOK 1004.02, supra note 42, at T-1, 6, 11, 12. There are distinct informed
consent requirements for research that are beyond the scope of this article and not
discussed herein. See, e.g., 38 C.F.R. pt. 16; Requirements for Protection Hum. Subjects
Research, VHA HANDBOOK 1200.05 (Dep’t Veterans Aff., Washington, D.C.), May 2,
2012, at 56–65; Assurance Protection for Human Subjects Research, VHA HANDBOOK
1058.03 (Dep’t Veterans Aff., Washington, D.C.), May 10, 2007.
84. 32 C.F.R. § 17.32(c) (2012).
85. VHA HANDBOOK 1004.01, supra note 78, at 3.
86. Id. (emphasis in original).
87. 38 C.F.R. § 17.32(d) (2012). See also VHA HANDBOOK 1004.01, supra note 78,
at 3.
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The VA provides expansive protections for patient rights in
relation to informed consent, which the regulations define as
“the freely given consent that follows a careful explanation by
the practitioner to the patient or the patient’s surrogate of the
proposed diagnostic or therapeutic procedure or course of
treatment.”84 VA patients have “the right to accept or refuse any
medical treatment or procedure recommended to them.”85
Although there are some exceptions (e.g., medical emergencies)
within the VA, “all treatments and procedures require the prior,
voluntary informed consent of the patient, or if the patient lacks
decision-making capacity, the patient’s authorized surrogate.”86
Oral consent suffices for some treatments, while others, e.g.,
those requiring sedation or anesthesia, require written or
“signature” consent.87 VA policy rejects the concept of “‘general’
or ‘blanket’ consent for medical treatment” and mandates that
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VHA HANDBOOK 1004.01, supra note 78, at 4.
Id.
38 C.F.R. § 17.32(g) (2012).
38 C.F.R. § 17.32(c) (2012). VHA HANDBOOK 1004.01, supra note 78, at 6–7.
VHA HANDBOOK 1004.01, supra note 78, at 6.
38 C.F.R. § 17.32(c) (2012). VHA HANDBOOK 1004.01, supra note 78, at 7.
VHA HANDBOOK 1004.01, supra note 78, at 5–6.
Id. at 1.
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90.
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92.
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the patient provide “separate consent for each treatment,
procedure, therapeutic course of treatment for a particular
problem or condition . . . or series of treatments (e.g., cycles of
chemotherapy).”88 The VA also requires a new informed
consent process “(1) [i]f there is a significant deviation from the
treatment plan to which the patient originally consented; or (2)
[i]f there is a change in the patient’s condition or diagnosis that
would reasonably be expected to alter the original informed
consent.”89 Heightened consent requirements apply in certain
situations, including “unusual or extremely hazardous treatment
or procedure,” and forced administration of psychotropic
medication.90
VA regulations and policy provide specific requirements for
the process of obtaining informed consent.91 The standard for
informed consent disclosure is a reasonable patient standard and
requires that the practitioner “[p]rovide information that a
patient, in similar circumstances, would reasonably want to
know.”92 The discussion must also include an explanation of the
patient’s condition and the recommended treatment, expected
risks and benefits, and reasonable alternatives.93
The informed consent process may only take place with a
patient who has decision making capacity, which is presumed in
the case of adults not adjudicated incompetent by a court of
law.94 In contrast to “competency” (a “legal determination made
by a court of law that a patient has the requisite capacities to
make a medical decision”) clinical evaluation determines
VA policy defines decision-making
decisional capacity.95
capacity to include four faculties: understanding, appreciating,
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formulating, and communicating.96 Under VA requirements, the
“practitioner who has primary responsibility for the patient”
determines whether the patient has decision making capacity.97
2. IMPLICATIONS OF DIFFERING STANDARDS OF CARE
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96. Id. at 1–2.
97. 38 C.F.R. § 17.32(e) (2012). See also VHA HANDBOOK 1004.01, supra note 78,
at 8.
98. WIS. STAT. § 448.30 (2012).
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The existence of the VA’s informed consent requirements
creates the possibility that the standard of care for informed
consent under state law will differ from – and even conflict with
– VA requirements. Although the VA and its providers have the
legal authority to follow VA requirements pursuant to the
Supremacy Clause, as discussed in Section IV.A, the differences
between state law and VA requirements for informed consent
may have implications for the VA’s liability under the Federal
Tort Claims Act and for licensure of VA providers.
Wisconsin law provides an example of state law informed
consent requirements that differ from VA requirements. The
Wisconsin statute requires a treating physician to “inform the
patient about the availability of all alternate, viable medical
modes of treatment and about the benefits and risks of these
treatments.”98 However, this duty specifically excludes the
following:
(1) Information beyond what a reasonably wellqualified physician in a similar medical classification
would know.
(2) Detailed technical information that in all probability
a patient would not understand.
(3) Risks apparent or known to the patient.
(4) Extremely remote possibilities that might falsely or
detrimentally alarm the patient.
(5) Information in emergencies where failure to
provide treatment would be more harmful to the
patient than treatment.
(6) Information in cases where the patient is incapable
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of consenting.99
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Id.
VHA HANDBOOK 1004.01, supra note 78, at 7.
WIS. STAT. § 448.30 (2012).
VHA HANDBOOK 1004.01, supra note 78, at 14.
WIS. STAT. § 448.30 (2012).
28 U.S.C. §§ 2679(b)(1), 2679(d) (2012).
28 U.S.C. §§ 2672, 2674 (2012).
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Thus, many of the exceptions to the Wisconsin informed
consent regulation differ from the VA informed consent
requirements. For example, the VA requires description of
“extremely unlikely” risks that “may result in death or
permanent disability,”100 while the Wisconsin provision permits
omitting the information if it “might falsely or detrimentally
alarm the patient.”101 The Wisconsin provision’s language of
“detrimentally alarm” may even hint at a physician’s potential
liability under Wisconsin law for disclosing such information.
Another example arises when a patient lacks decisional capacity
and has a surrogate who has provided consent for a treatment or
procedure. The VA requires the practitioner to “explain to the
patient the treatment or procedure to which the surrogate has
consented, if feasible,”102 while the Wisconsin provision appears
to reject such a duty.103
To the extent a patient wished to pursue legal action for a
VA employee’s negligence with regard to informed consent (or
any other aspect of medical malpractice), under the Westfall Act,
the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) would be the exclusive
remedy for such an action, and the proper defendant would be
the United States (i.e., not the individual employee).104 The
FTCA represents a limited waiver of sovereign immunity that
allows suit against the United States for its negligent actions.
Under the FTCA, other than pre-judgment interest and punitive
damages, the United States is liable in the same manner and to
the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances
for negligent acts or omissions of any employee of the
government while acting in the scope of employment.105 The
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law of the state where the tort occurred applies to determine
negligence in a case brought under the FTCA.106 In the case of a
medical malpractice action based on the failure to meet the
standard of care with regard to informed consent, state law
would likely consist of common law and possibly codified
provisions.
However, if a conflict of laws issue arose between federal
and state law in a medical malpractice action based on
compliance with VA requirements in the informed consent
process, it is likely that the VA’s waiver of sovereign immunity
under the FTCA would not apply, and, therefore, the VA would
not face potential liability under the FTCA. This is due to the
fact that the FTCA provides the following “discretionary
function” exception to the waiver of sovereign immunity:
Any claim based upon an act or omission of an
employee of the Government, exercising due care, in
the execution of a statute or regulation, whether or not
such statute or regulation be valid, or based upon the
exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or
perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of
a federal agency or an employee of the Government . .
. .107
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As discussed above, the VA’s informed consent
requirements are set forth in applicable statute, regulations, and
corresponding policies, and, as such, it appears that the
discretionary function exception would likely apply to an
employee who acts pursuant to those requirements. The net
result would be that a potential tort claimant would not be able
to sue the United States or its employees based on compliance
with the VA informed consent requirements. The author could
locate no cases dismissing an individual’s claim under the FTCA
based on compliance with VA informed consent requirements in
the face of a conflict between federal and state informed consent
requirements. However, one court has indicated that the United

07/02/2013 13:56:24

106. 28 U.S.C. 1346(b) (2012).
107. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (2012).
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States would only face liability under the FTCA for negligence
with regard to informed consent if state law imposed liability;
i.e., failure to meet the VA informed consent standard set forth
in 38 C.F.R. Section 17.32(a) would not suffice to waive
sovereign immunity.108
Regardless of the VA’s potential liability under the FTCA,
however, there is also the corollary issue that VA providers must
hold a valid state license in at least one state,109 and some
informed consent requirements may represent an exercise of a
state’s authority with regard to licensure of its professionals. For
example, the Wisconsin informed consent statute is set forth
under the Medical Examining Board subchapter of the Medical
Practices Act.110 The issue of how a state licensing body would
resolve a potential conflict in this area is beyond the scope of this
article and would likely depend on the specific state licensure
requirement at issue and the clinical facts of a particular
situation. However, in the event a state licensing body would
pursue action against a VA provider’s license based on
compliance with VA informed consent requirements, the VA
could argue that such compliance is protected by the Supremacy
Clause and the VA requirements discussed in Section IV.A.
C. ADVANCE DIRECTIVES
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108. Welch v. U.S., 737 F. Supp. 2d 18, 30 n.14 (D. Me. 2010) (citing Sea Air
Shuttle Corp. v. U.S., 112 F.3d 532, 536 (1st Cir. 1997); Dimmick v. Regents of the
Univ. of Cal., 2006 WL 279350 (N.D. Cal. 2006).
109. 38 U.S.C. § 7402(b)(1)(C) (2012).
110. WIS. STAT. § 448.30 (2012).
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VA policy with regard to advance care planning is based
on the following premises:
(1) All adult patients who have decision-making
capacity have the right to accept or refuse proposed
medical treatments or procedures, regardless of the
expected consequences; and
(2) For patients who have lost decision-making
capacity, the health care preferences they stated in
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advance need to be honored to the extent permitted by
clinical and professional standards, and the law.111

VHA HANDBOOK 1004.02, supra note 42, at 1.
Id.
38 C.F.R. § 17.32(h) (2012).
VHA HANDBOOK 1004.02, supra note 42, at 3, 10.
Id. at 3.
38 C.F.R. § 17.32(h)(4) (2012).
38 C.F.R. § 17.32(a)(iii) (2012).
VHA HANDBOOK 1004.02, supra note 42, at 2.
Id. at 10.
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The VA is committed to honoring patient preferences via
“patient-centered care” and “shared decision making, an
ongoing collaborative process between practitioners and
patients or their surrogates.”112
In addition to recognizing its own advance directive forms,
the VA recognizes “an advance directive that is valid in one or
more States under applicable State law,”113 which VA policy
refers to as “State-Authorized Advance Directive[s],” 114 and the
VA also recognizes U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) advance
However, VA policy provides that such
directives.115
recognition of non-VA advance directives does not apply to
“portions of an Advance Directive . . . that are not consistent
with VA policy.”116 The VA provides patients wide discretion in
determining which state’s law to utilize when executing a StateAuthorized Advance Directive; “applicable State law” can mean
the law of the state where the advance directive was signed, the
State where the patient now resides, or the State where the
patient is receiving treatment.117 VA policy explicitly prohibits
the use of advance directives for decision making in the case of a
patient who has decision making capacity.118
Acknowledging that VA advance directives may not bear
legal weight outside of the VA, the VA permits patients to have
a State-authorized advance directive, a VA advance directive, or
both types of advance directives.119 In doing so, the VA offers its
patients greater freedom of choice with regard to advance
directives than patients at non-VA facilities, who only have the
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option to use advance directives recognized by state law.
(Although most states have reciprocity provisions recognizing
advance directives that are valid under the law of another state,
such provisions typically limit the recognition to portions that
do not conflict with that state’s own law).120 There are various
ways that this freedom impacts patient choice, as discussed
herein.
1. OVERVIEW OF VA ADVANCE DIRECTIVES
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Olick, supra note 45, at 234. See, e.g., WIS. STAT. §§ 154.11(9), 155.70(10)
VHA HANDBOOK 1004.02, supra note 42, at app. A.
Id.
Id.
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The VA advance directive form is VA Form 10-0137, VA
Advance Directive: Durable Power of Attorney for Health Care
and Living Will.121 The VA advance directive includes a durable
power of attorney for health care, which, like state forms, allows
an individual to designate a person to make decisions for that
individual in the event he/she is no longer able to do so.122 The
VA advance directive also contains a living will section that
allows the individual to express specific treatment preferences,
including those pertaining to life-sustaining treatments (e.g.,
cardiopulmonary respiration, mechanical ventilation, kidney
dialysis, and artificial nutrition and hydration) and mental
health preferences.123
The VA advance directive is perhaps most notable for what
it lacks, namely some of the restrictions on patient choice that
exist in State-authorized advance directives. The VA advance
directive is relatively open-ended in both the power of attorney
for health care and living will sections and, as such, allows
patients to make certain decisions that may not be permitted
under a State-authorized advance directive.
As indicated by the following, the VA advance directive’s
durable power of attorney for health care provides extremely
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broad discretion to the designated Health Care Agent:
If you get too sick to make decisions for yourself, your
Health Care Agent will have the authority to make all
health care decisions for you. This includes decisions to
admit and discharge you from any hospital or other
health care institution. Your Health Care Agent can
also decide to start or stop any type of health care
treatment . . . .124
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124. Id. (emphasis added).
125. WIS. STAT. § 155.30(3) (2012); STATE OF WIS., F-00085, POWER OF ATTORNEY
FOR HEALTH CARE (Rev. June 2011).
126. WIS. STAT. § 155.20 (2012).
127. WIS. STAT. § 155.30(2) (2012).
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In contrast to the VA form, some State-authorized advance
directives limit the authority of the health care agent to make
certain types of health care decisions. For example, the State of
Wisconsin Power of Attorney for Health Care form contains
numerous limitations including the following: 1) prohibiting a
health care agent from consenting to various types of mental
health treatment, including inpatient admission to an institution
for mental diseases and electroconvulsive treatment; 2)
prohibiting a health care agent from admitting the individual to
a nursing home or community-based residential facility for a
long-term stay unless the individual executing the form
specifically grants the health care agent that authority; 3)
prohibiting a health care agent from consenting to withholding
or withdrawal of orally ingested nutrition or hydration unless
provision of the nutrition or hydration is medically
contraindicated and the individual specifically grants the health
care agent that authority; and 4) prohibiting a health care agent
from making health care decisions for an individual who is
pregnant unless she specifically grants the health care agent that
authority.125 Wisconsin law also imposes the same limitations on
a health care agent designated under a power of attorney for
health care form other than the state form,126 i.e., one drafted by
an attorney, as permitted under Wis. Stat. Section 155.30(2).127
The VA advance directive’s living will is also broad in
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comparison to some state forms. In addition to containing
sections addressing preferences about life-sustaining treatments
and mental health preferences, the VA advance directive’s living
will contains an open-ended section for additional preferences.128
Examples include, “social, cultural, or faith-based preferences
for care, or preferences about treatments such as feeding tubes,
blood transfusions, or pain medications.”129
The State of Wisconsin Declaration to Physicians (Living
Will), in contrast, only addresses the use of life-sustaining
procedures and feeding tubes in the event of a terminal
condition or persistent vegetative state, and the applicable
statute limits the scope of the State of Wisconsin Living Will to
those treatment preferences.130 Although the State of Wisconsin
Power of Attorney for Health Care form provides a section for
the individual to address other “desires, special provisions or
limitations” not otherwise addressed in the document,131 the
State of Wisconsin Living Will does not provide such a section.
Accordingly, individuals who wish to express treatment
preferences not listed in the State of Wisconsin Living Will form
may only do so through a health care agent. This limitation
could restrict choice for isolated individuals who do not have a
suitable, willing person to serve as a health care agent.

With regard to MHADs, the VA’s approach is notable for
two reasons: 1) it provides patients the ability to execute a
MHAD, a freedom that some states do not provide; and 2) it
attempts to provide equal treatment for both MHADs and
general advance directives, i.e., by rejecting some of the
heightened restrictions and other special requirements imposed
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128. VHA HANDBOOK 1004.02, supra note 42, at app. A.
129. Id.
130. WIS. STAT. § 154.03 (2012); STATE OF WIS., F-00060, DECLARATION TO
PHYSICIANS (Rev. Aug. 2008) (Wisconsin Living Will).
131. WIS. STAT. § 155.30(3) (2012); STATE OF WIS., F-00085, POWER OF ATTORNEY
FOR HEALTH CARE (Rev. June 2011).
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WIS. STAT. § 155.20 (2012).
VHA HANDBOOK 1004.02, supra note 42, at app. A.
Id.
WIS. STAT. § 154.03 (2012).
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by some state laws.
The contrast between VA requirements and Wisconsin law
with regard to MHADs illustrates the great potential
significance of an individual’s decision to engage in advance
care planning within the VA as opposed to under state law.
Under Wisconsin law, individuals are very restricted in their
ability to engage in advance care planning for mental health
treatment preferences. Wisconsin is one of the states that does
not offer a mental health advance directive form. Furthermore,
Wisconsin law imposes restrictions on the use of general
advance directives that, essentially, prevent their use for mental
health treatment preferences.
As discussed above, the VA gives a health care agent under
a durable power of attorney for health care wide latitude to
make treatment decisions. In particular, VA patients have the
ability to designate an agent to make mental health treatment
decisions that Wisconsin law would not permit, such as consent
to inpatient mental health treatment and electroconvulsive
therapy.132
The VA also provides patients the opportunity to express
specific mental health treatment preferences in directive form in
an open-ended section of the VA advance directive living will.133
This section contains no limitations and offers the option to
document any mental health treatment preferences, including
but not limited to “medications that have worked for you in the
past and that you would want again, or . . . mental health
facilities or hospitals that you like and those that you don’t
like.”134 In contrast, Wisconsin law does not provide the
opportunity to express mental health treatment preferences in its
living will, which is limited in scope to preferences pertaining to
life-sustaining procedures and feeding tubes.135 Thus, VA
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3. REVOCATION OF ADVANCE DIRECTIVES
In addition to substantive differences in the content of
advance directives, the VA may differ from state law on the
issue of when a patient may revoke an advance directive. The
applicable VA regulation states that, “[a] patient who has
decision-making capacity may revoke an advance directive . . . at
any time by using any means expressing the intent to revoke.”138
Since there is no provision addressing the right of a non-
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136. NAT’L ETHICS COMM. VETERANS HEALTH ADMIN., supra note 53, at 3–4.
137. Id. at 2.
138. 38 C.F.R. § 17.32(h)(3) (2012).
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patients who are Wisconsin residents have far greater latitude to
control their mental health treatment decisions in the event they
are no longer able to make those decisions for themselves.
In addition to offering patients broad discretion to engage
in advance care planning with regard to mental health treatment
preferences, the VA’s policy on MHADs is generally one that
avoids treating MHADs differently than general advance
directives. For example, the VA has declined the following,
which, as discussed above, represent some state approaches to
MHADs: 1) requiring automatic expiration of MHADs; 2)
imposing special restrictions on who may serve as a witness to a
MHAD as compared with a general advance directive; 3)
permitting providers to override MHADs in special
circumstances that would not enable a provider to override a
general advance directive; 4) imposing a capacity assessment
requirement for execution of an MHAD; 5) permitting activation
of a MHAD while a patient has decision-making capacity; and 6)
imposing special restrictions on the revocation of MHADs that
do not apply to general advance directives.136 By rejecting such
state law approaches, the VA affirms its policy as one that offers
parity for mental health treatment as compared with general
medical treatment and attempts to minimize the stigma that can
accompany mental illness.137
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decisional patient to revoke an advance directive, it appears that
the VA requires a patient have decision-making capacity in
order to revoke an advance directive; the National Ethics
Committee of the Veterans Health Administration has affirmed
this interpretation.139
In contrast, Wisconsin law, like a majority of states,140
permits an individual to revoke his/her power of attorney for
health care and/or instructional advance directive (i.e., State of
Wisconsin Living Will) “at any time.”141 A principal may revoke
a power of attorney for health care via the following methods:
(a) Canceling, defacing, obliterating, burning, tearing or
otherwise destroying the power of attorney for health
care instrument or directing another in the presence of
the principal to so destroy the power of attorney for
health care instrument.
(b) Executing a statement, in writing, that is signed and
dated by the principal, expressing the principal’s intent
to revoke the power of attorney for health care.
(c) Verbally expressing the principal’s intent to revoke
the power of attorney for health care, in the presence of
2 witnesses.
(d) Executing a subsequent power of attorney for health
care instrument.142

NAT’L ETHICS COMM. VETERANS HEALTH ADMIN., supra note 53, at 9.
Id.
WIS. STAT. §§ 155.40(1), 154.05(1) (2012).
WIS. STAT. § 155.40(1) (2012).
WIS. STAT. § 154.05 (2012).
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The methods for revoking a Wisconsin living will are nearly
identical to those for revocation of a power of attorney for health
care, with the exception that Wisconsin law does not require two
witnesses for verbal revocation of a Wisconsin living will but
does impose a requirement of notification of the attending
physician of the subsequent declaration.143
The Wisconsin statutes do not define “principal” (one who
executes a power of attorney for health care) to require that the
individual has decision-making capacity, and the corresponding
statute setting forth the requirements for executing a power of
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144. WIS. STAT. § 155.05(1) (2012).
145. WIS. STAT. § 155.40(1) (2012).
146. COAL. OF WIS. AGING GRPS., REVOKING A POWER OF ATTORNEY FOR HEALTH
CARE (2011), available at http://cwagwisconsin.org/wp-content/uploads/
2011/03/Revoking-a-Power-of-Attorney-for-Health-Care.pdf.
147. WIS. STAT. § 155.05(1) (2012).
148. WIS. STAT. § 155.40(1) (2012).
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attorney for health care explicitly states that such individual
must be “of sound mind,”144 which one could reasonably
interpret to include some capacity to make health care decisions.
Given that the legislature chose to include the “sound mind”
requirement for execution of a power of attorney for health care
and not for revocation of a power of attorney for health care, it
appears that there is no “sound mind” requirement for
revocation. Rather, under a “plain meaning” interpretation of
the statutory language addressing revocation, an individual may
revoke a power of attorney for health care under Wisconsin law
regardless of his/her decisional capacity (and regardless of
whether his/her power of attorney is activated), provided that
the individual is able to perform one of the acts of revocation
listed in the statute;145 this interpretation is consistent with the
position of the Wisconsin Guardianship Support Center of the
Coalition of Wisconsin Aging Groups.146 Some of the methods
listed in Sections (a) and (c) of Wisconsin Statute Section
155.40(1) are acts that could be relatively easy for an individual
with no, or questionable, decision-making capacity to perform.
For example, one could readily foresee a situation in which an
individual lacks the mental capacity to weigh the risks, benefits,
and other complexities of a health care decision but is able to
deface a power of attorney for health care or verbally express the
intent to revoke the power of attorney for health care in the
presence of two witnesses.
Due to the “sound mind”
requirement for execution of a power of attorney for health
care,147 however, an individual lacking decisional capacity
would likely not have the legal authority to revoke an existing
power of attorney for health care by executing a new one.148
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The Wisconsin statutes do not define “declarant” as one
who executes a Wisconsin living will. However, similar analysis
applies, in that the statute for execution of a Wisconsin living
will includes a “sound mind requirement,”149 while the
revocation statute does not.150 Accordingly, it does not appear
that a declarant must have decisional capacity to revoke a
Wisconsin living will.
The fact that a nondecisional individual may revoke a
power of attorney for health care under Wisconsin law and not
under VA requirements can raise complex legal issues. In the
case of a VA inpatient who lacks decisional capacity, it appears
that such patient would not have the legal authority under VA
requirements to revoke either a VA advance directive or a state
authorized advance directive. As discussed above, in the event
of a conflict between state law and VA requirements, VA
requirements (which require decisionality for revocation) would
control in terms of VA operations.
However, the issue becomes murkier in some cases.
Consider the hypothetical case of an individual who receives
care at the VA on an outpatient basis, whose advance directive
has been activated (i.e., the patient has been deemed
nondecisional), who subsequently commits an act of revocation
under state law while in the community (i.e., outside of the VA),
and then returns to the VA for care in a nondecisional state.
While the revocation may be legally sufficient outside of the VA,
it may be difficult to discern whether VA requirements permit or
require the VA to honor the revocation.
As stated above, the VA imposes the condition that patients
have decision-making capacity in order to revoke an advance
directive. According to the proposed facts of the hypothetical
scenario, it is unclear whether the patient had the capacity to
revoke the advance directive. VA policy states that a patient is
“presumed to have decision-making capacity unless an
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149. WIS. STAT. § 154.03(1) (2012).
150. WIS. STAT. § 154.05(1) (2012).
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151. VHA HANDBOOK 1004.02, supra note 42, at 12.
152. 38 C.F.R. § 17.32(e) (2012). See also VHA HANDBOOK 1004.02, supra note 42,
at 3.
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appropriate clinical evaluation determines that the patient lacks
decision-making capacity, the patient is a minor, or the patient
has been ruled incompetent by a court of law.”151 Under VA
requirements, the “practitioner who has primary responsibility
for the patient” determines whether the patient has decisionmaking capacity.152 Accordingly, in our example, it appears that
the “practitioner who has primary responsibility for the patient”
would determine whether he/she had the capacity to revoke the
advance directive. Perhaps the patient has a condition (e.g.,
permanent brain damage) that the VA practitioner knows would
have prevented the patient from having capacity at all times
since the VA’s activation of the advance directive. Or, perhaps,
the VA practitioner saw the patient in close proximity to the
time of the revocation and determined that the patient lacked
decision making capacity at that time. In such cases, the VA’s
capacity requirement for revocation would appear to dictate that
the VA not honor the revocation. This would create the result of
the revocation having legal weight outside of the VA (i.e., at
private facilities), but not in the VA system. Alternatively, the
provider may be unable to determine whether the patient had
the capacity to revoke the advance directive because the
provider did not see the patient around the time of the
revocation and/or the patient’s condition is one that results in
fluctuating capacity, alternating between periods of
nondecisionality and periods of lucidity. Under such facts, the
VA requirements may call for the VA to honor the revocation
based on the default presumption of capacity. The legal analysis
for these types of situations is highly fact-specific, warranting a
case-by-case legal analysis. Additionally, ethics consultation
may also help to resolve these issues.
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4. DUAL ADVANCE DIRECTIVE SITUATIONS

VHA HANDBOOK 1004.02, supra note 42, at 13.
Id.
WIS. STAT. § 155.30(3) (2012).
VHA HANDBOOK 1004.02, supra note 42, at app. A.
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The fact that the VA permits a patient to have both a VA
advance directive and a State-authorized advance directive also
can create interesting legal scenarios. VA policy provides that
both valid advance directives apply.153 However, in the event of
a conflict, “the most recent one (as determined by examination
of the date applied by the patient at the time the document was
While this approach for resolving
signed) prevails.”154
conflicting advance directives may sound simple, complexities
can (and do) arise. When comparing the VA advance directive
with certain State-authorized advance directives, such as the
Wisconsin forms, potential conflict is readily apparent and due
in large part to the required, restrictive language embedded in
the state form. For example, in the “Provision of Feeding Tube”
Section, the Wisconsin Power of Attorney for Health Care form
expressly states, “[m]y health care agent may not have orally
ingested nutrition or hydration withheld or withdrawn from me
unless provision of the nutrition or hydration is medically
contraindicated,”155 while the VA advance directive contains no
such restriction.156 Accordingly, a VA patient could execute a
VA advance directive designating a health care agent under the
durable power of attorney for health care section and indicate in
the living will section that the patient refuses, under any
circumstances, to receive nutrition and/or hydration via feeding
tube. In the event the VA patient also executed a Wisconsin
Durable Power of Attorney for Health Care form, the two forms
would conflict and raise the challenge of discerning what the
patient truly would have wanted.
It is important to note that the VA provision to honor the
“most recent” valid advance directive does not always resolve
conflicts between advance directives. Consider a VA social
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worker who, as part of the discharge planning process, assists a
VA patient in completing both a VA advance directive and a
State-authorized advance directive.
The State-authorized
advance directive offers the patient the advantage of its
applicability outside of the VA, while the VA advance directive
offers the patient broad latitude to express treatment
preferences. The VA advance directive form, like some state
forms, such as Wisconsin’s, does not require or provide a field
for the time when the individual executed the document. Unless
the individual executing the document happened to note the
time of signature or the social worker is available and recalls the
execution of the advance directives, it may not be possible to tell
which document is “most recent” and, therefore, controls.
D. SURROGATES
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157. 38 C.F.R. § 17.32(a)(1) (2012). See also VHA HANDBOOK 1004.01, supra note
78, at 3.
158. 38 C.F.R. § 17.32(e) (2012).
159. VHA HANDBOOK 1004.01, supra note 78, at 3.
160. VA policy does provide, however, for certain checks on a surrogate’s
power, such as when a “practitioner considers the surrogate to be clearly acting
contrary to the patient’s values and wishes or the patient’s best interests. Id. at 14.
In those cases, “the practitioner must notify the Chief of Staff, or designee, and
consult with the local Integrated Ethics program officer or Regional Counsel before
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In addition to having a distinct advance directive form, the
VA has its own framework for surrogate decision making. The
VA defines Surrogate Decision Maker (“Surrogate”) as an
“individual, organization or other body authorized under this
section to give informed consent on behalf of a patient who lacks
decision-making capacity.”157 A surrogate “generally assumes
the same rights and responsibilities as the patient in the
informed consent process.”158 This delegation of authority is
particularly broad in light of the VA’s acknowledgment of all
patients’ “right to accept or refuse any medical treatment or
Accordingly, a VA
procedure recommended to them.”159
patient’s surrogate assumes the position of the patient with
substantial freedom to make health care decisions.160
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VA regulations and policy set forth the following Priority of
Surrogates, who may provide informed consent on a patient’s
behalf:
(1) Health care agent;
(2) Legal guardian or special guardian;
(3) Next-of-kin: a close relative of the patient eighteen
years of age or older, in the following priority: spouse,
child, parent, sibling, grandparent, or grandchild; or
(4) Close friend.161
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implementing the surrogate’s decision.” Id.
161. 38 C.F.R. § 17.32(e) (2012). See also VHA HANDBOOK 1004.01, supra note 78,
at 13.
162. See, e.g., COAL. OF WIS. AGING GRPS., AN OVERVIEW OF ADVANCE
DIRECTIVES (2011), available at http://cwagwisconsin.org/wp-content/uploads/
2011/06/An-Overview-of-Advance-Directives.pdf.
163. 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. 40/25 (2012).
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This hierarchy has multi-faceted legal significance. First,
VA hierarchy contrasts with states that do not provide a list of
surrogates, such as spouse and next of kin, who may make
decisions for a patient in the event he/she did not designate a
health care agent under a durable power of attorney for health
care. Wisconsin is one such state. Under Wisconsin law, if a
patient did not execute a durable power of attorney for health
care, the patient’s spouse would not have legal authority to
make health care decisions for the patient absent judicial
intervention (i.e., appointment as guardian of the patient’s
person).162 In contrast, if the patient received care at a VA
facility, the spouse would be the default decision-maker, with
full legal authority to make treatment decisions for the patient,
absent a health care agent or legal guardian.
Second, when compared with state law, the VA hierarchy
may grant authority to individuals in a different order of
priority than a particular state does. For example, Illinois law
does not include “grandparent” in its hierarchy for surrogate
decision making.163 Thus, assuming no higher-level surrogates
were available, a grandparent would have legal authority to
make health care decisions for a VA patient but not for the same
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individual in the event he/she received treatment at a non-VA
facility in Illinois.
In addition, by including “close friend” in the list or
surrogates, the VA provides individuals who are not related to
the patient by blood or marriage the potential opportunity to
make health care decisions for the patient. VA defines “close
friend” as “[a]ny person eighteen years or older who has shown
care and concern for the patient’s welfare; who is familiar with
the patient’s activities, health, religious beliefs and values . . .
This provision may be of particular importance to
.“164
significant others in the case of unmarried couples, who may not
have any legal rights to make health care decisions in the
absence of a durable power of attorney for health care under
state law.
In the event no surrogate is available, the VA has its own
unique process for making health care decisions for an
incapacitated individual.165 In such cases a VA facility may
either obtain a guardian or adhere to the following process:
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164. 38 C.F.R. § 17.32(a) (2012). See also VHA HANDBOOK 1004.01, supra note 78,
at 1.
165. 38 C.F.R. § 17.32(f) (2012). See also VHA HANDBOOK 1004.01, supra note 78,
at 14.
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For treatments or procedures that involve minimal risk,
the practitioner must verify that no authorized
surrogate can be located.
The practitioner must
attempt to explain the nature and purpose of the
proposed treatment to the patient and enter this
information in the health record. For procedures that
require signature consent, the practitioner must certify
that the patient has no surrogate. The attending
physician and the Chief of Service (or his or her
designee) must indicate their approval of the treatment
decision in writing. Any decision to withhold or
withdraw life-sustaining treatment for such patients
must be reviewed by a multi-disciplinary committee
appointed by the facility Director. The committee
functions as the patient’s advocate and may not include
members of the treatment team. The committee must
submit its findings and recommendations in a written
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report to the Chief of Staff who must note his or her
approval of the report in writing. After reviewing the
record, the facility Director may concur with the
decision to withhold or withdraw life support or
request further review by Regional Counsel.166
This process is significant because it provides a mechanism
for decision making in non-emergency situations for patients
who lack a surrogate without requiring judicial intervention.
One legal commentator has described the benefits of this process
as “conspicuously quicker, cheaper, and more efficient than the
state guardianship process.”167 Given the VA’s high population
of homeless veterans and other veterans who may lack
appropriate or available surrogates, this process provides a
useful means to making decisions for incapacitated veterans in a
manner that maintains respect and protections for such veterans.
V. CONCLUSION
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166. 38 C.F.R. § 17.32(f) (2012).
167. Casey Frank, Surrogate Decision-Making for “Friendless” Patients, 34 COLO.
LAW. 71, 75 (2005).
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There are significant differences between VA and state law
requirements pertaining to health care decision making. The
examples highlighting Wisconsin law discussed herein represent
just a small subsection of these differences, which will depend
on the state law at issue. An individual’s decision to make
health care decisions and engage in advance care planning
within the VA or under state law can have significant impact on
the choices available to that individual, the processes for
decision making, and, thus, the clinical outcomes. Individuals
eligible to receive care from the VA and health care providers
who advise them should be aware of this impact and consider
the differences between VA and state law when making health
care decisions and participating in advance care planning.
In addition, while the use of VA forms may provide
patients with increased freedom with regard to the expression of
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certain health care preferences (e.g., mental health treatment
preferences), the VA forms may not have legal recognition
outside of the VA system, thus creating the potential need for a
patient to also have a state-authorized advance directive. Dual
directives, in turn, can raise potential conflicts both legally and
in terms of patient preferences.
Individuals who provide care at the VA should be aware of
the unique requirements governing practice within the Agency.
The VA’s authority pursuant to the Supremacy Clause gives the
Agency wide latitude to follow these requirements. In the event
of a potential conflict between VA requirements and state law,
the VA has various resources to navigate such conflicts,
including ethics consultation, the National Center for Ethics in
Health Care, and the Office of General Counsel. However,
additional legal discourse may be warranted to examine the
potential conflicts associated with VA requirements and state
law requirements (e.g., those pertaining to licensure), and future
case law may illustrate the significance of these conflicts.
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